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Abstract: 
Social media has quickly become a dominant mode of professional and personal communication. Unfortunately,
groups who intend to perform illegal and/or harmful activities (such as gangs, criminal groups, and terrorist groups)
also use it. These covert networks use social media to foster membership, communicate among followers and non-
followers, and obtain ideological and financial support. This exploitation of social media has serious political, cultural,
and societal repercussions that go beyond stolen identities, hacked systems, or loss of productivity. There are literal
life-and-death consequences of the actions of the groups behind these covert networks. However, through tracking
and analyzing social media content, government agencies (in particular those in the intelligence community) can
mitigate this threat by uncovering these covert networks, their communication, and their plans. This paper introduces
common social media analysis techniques and the current approaches of analyzing covert networks. A case study of
the Syrian conflict, with particular attention on ISIS, highlights this exploitation and the process of using social media
analysis for intelligence gathering. The results of the case study show that covert networks are resilient and
continually adapt their social media use and presence to stay ahead of the intelligence community. 
Keywords: Social Media, Covert Networks, ISIS, Social Media Analysis, Social Media Exploitation, Intelligence
Gathering, Case Study. 
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1 Introduction 
Information technology (IT) permeates society and impacts all aspects of personal and professional 
interactions and communications with other individuals and organizations. Social media has quickly 
become a dominant mode of professional and personal communication (Fan & Gordon, 2014; Morrison 
2014). Services such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Instagram, Snapchat, and Tumblr each have 
hundreds of millions of users worldwide. Facebook’s 1.2+ billion users (Ajmera, 2014) generate more 
video views than all of YouTube: 12.3 billion versus 11.3 billion in June 2014 (Brynley-Jones, 2014). 
Twitter sees 500 million tweets per day (Smith, 2015). Instagram has grown to over 300 million active 
accounts to surpass Twitter’s 284 million active accounts (Brynley-Jones, 2014). Most impacts of IT are 
seen as positive, but individuals and groups can exploit, misuse, or abuse IT. Social networks enhance 
many forms of socially beneficial activities (Jackson, 2008; McBride & Hewitt, 2013), but they can also 
encourage harmful and dangerous behaviors. These covert and illegal networks, also referred to as dark 
networks in the related literature, are in contrast to light networks or bright networks, which are overt and 
legal (Raab & Milward, 2003; Milward & Raab, 2006). Identifying these threats is not sufficient; we need to 
mitigate the threats in order to preserve IT’s benefits. 
Covert networks use social media to foster membership, communicate among followers and non-
followers, and obtain ideological and financial support (Freeman, 2011; Everton, 2012a; Topol, 2012; 
Freeman & Ruehsen, 2013; Freeman & Schroeder, 2014; Sanchez, 2015). This exploitation of social 
media has serious political, cultural, and societal repercussions that go beyond stolen identities, hacked 
systems, or loss of productivity. There are literal life-and-death consequences of the actions of the groups 
behind these covert networks. 
The existence of these covert networks is not new. However, their relatively recent integration of social 
media into their operations and communications represents an exploitation of the Internet and of social 
media networks in particular. Communication via social media is (usually) instantaneous; reaches 
hundreds, thousands, or millions of other users; and is easily sharable by anyone even if not an original 
recipient. Social media benefits covert networks by providing an efficient and effective means of 
communication, which enables them to spread their messages to a larger audience. The ever-changing 
nature of these networks and the sheer amount of social media data that exist make it difficult for 
researchers and analysts to collect data and conduct real-time analyses. In addition, one can quickly and 
easily create new user accounts when existing accounts are shut down, which enables these networks to 
stay ahead of the intelligence community (Freeman & Schroeder, 2014). 
However, through tracking and analyzing social media content, government agencies and, in particular, 
those in the intelligence community can mitigate this threat by uncovering these covert networks, their 
communication, and their plans (Everton, 2012a). When used by those in the intelligence community, 
social media data can provide an extra-intelligence source of information to supplement other sources. 
Used carefully, social media can indicate trends and information that inform operational decisions for 
those in the field: police, military forces, and other law-enforcement agencies. 
This paper highlights social media analysis techniques and some of the current approaches to analyze 
covert networks. We present a framework for analyzing social media along with several analysis 
methodologies. The framework provides a guide for analysts: begin with a research question, collect 
baseline data, combine or fuse multiple datasets, and, finally, analyze social media data through a variety 
of techniques. Such analysis can take many forms, each with its own advantages and disadvantages, 
including geospatial, relational, temporal, and sentiment analysis. 
We present a case study of the Syrian conflict with particular attention on ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq 
and Syria) to highlight this exploitation of social media by covert networks, the process of using social 
media analysis for intelligence gathering, and the inability of the intelligence community to fully mitigate 
this threat. Opposition groups in Syria, including ISIS, use social media to recruit new members, raise 
funds, share information, and garner support from the outside world. The case study shows how one can 
apply the social media analysis techniques to a real-time situation in order to gain additional intelligence 
information. We conclude the paper by discussing the limitations of such methods and the possibilities for 
future research. 
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2 Background 
2.1 Social Media 
Social media refers to “a group of internet-based applications that build on the ideological and 
technological foundations of Web 2.0 and that allow the creation and exchange of user-generated content” 
(Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010, p. 61). With Web 2.0 technologies, users can interact with and collaborate on 
content rather than simply viewing or reading it (Web 1.0). While Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Instagram, 
Snapchat, and Tumblr garner much of the media attention, others such as Google+, LinkedIn, Pinterest, 
Vine, WhatsApp, Foursquare, and Reddit are but just a small selection of the hundreds of current social 
media services. There are also regional and country-specific platforms, such as VK in Russia and Eastern 
Europe (similar to Facebook) and Sina Weibo (a mix of Facebook and Twitter), Tencent Weibo (similar to 
Twitter), and WeChat (multiple messaging services) in mainland China. Moreover, the social media 
landscape is constantly changing as new services and networks enter and existing services depart or 
merge. 
Social media concerns interactions and the exchange of content not unlike traditional media. However, 
social media differs from traditional media in several key ways. The quality of the content has a relatively 
narrow range in traditional media, while the quality of the content in social media can vary considerably. 
Traditional media often has centralized structures for organization, production, and delivery, while social 
media is more decentralized and less structured. Similarly, traditional media outlets are often accessible to 
a small subset of the population (usually government or privately owned businesses), while social media 
is available to the public (or at least anyone with Internet access). The time between production and 
delivery in traditional media can be long (consider a magazine article or even a book), while there is 
virtually no lag at all in most social media production and delivery. 
Although content quality may have greater variation in social media, social media’s decentralized 
structure, widely accessible platforms, and (nearly) instantaneous content delivery provide opportunities 
for anyone with Internet access on their computer, smartphone, or tablet to easily create content, interact 
with others, collaborate on projects, and coordinate efforts. Users do not require a degree, specialized 
software, or expensive equipment. Social media users can, often with little effort and no cost, post, create, 
share, exchange, and comment as they desire. The ability to participate in social media with mobile 
devices, especially smartphones, enables individuals around the world to stay in constant contact with 
their social media networks and actively participate wherever and whenever they wish. As an example, 
nearly 80 percent of Twitter’s users access Twitter via their smartphone (Ajmera, 2014). 
Each of the individual social media networks and the collective and interconnected networks that make up 
the contemporary Web 2.0 landscape provide the means for individuals, groups, and organizations of all 
types to communicate with their friends, members, and constituents. Set apart from traditional push-based 
communication of traditional websites, these networks are filled with user-generated content including 
text, pictures, videos, links, and the interconnections with other users and their content through tags, 
keywords, and sharing. 
As social media usage permeates society, the quantity and value of the data and information 
communicated on these networks grow. The opinions and thoughts of previously inaccessible populations 
are now public. For example, social media can provide a strong indication of crowd thinking regarding the 
stock market (Bollen, Mao, & Zeng, 2011) and disease outbreaks (Schmidt, 2012) and an enhanced 
understanding of the human domain from a grassroots level (Di Leonardo et al., 2014). Social media 
communication aggregators can provide analysts and researchers with vast data sets of content pulled 
from multiple social media services at once. When these data are appropriately filtered and analyzed, 
researchers can find answers to previously unanswered questions and analysts can fill in gaps of missing 
information with greater efficacy than using a single social media service. 
2.2 Covert Networks 
Typically, covert networks refer to terrorist groups, drug traffickers, extreme political movements, gangs, 
and other criminal enterprises (Bright, Hughes, & Chalmers, 2012; McBride & Hewitt, 2013). The 
reference point and context are important because the Nazis in Germany would have considered the 
networks created during WWII to hide and safeguard European Jews as covert (and criminal), while most 
of the rest of the world would not have. The same definition holds true in networks that exist in social 
media, and many of these same covert networks have a presence in social media. 
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Researchers and analysts face increased difficulties analyzing covert networks. Access to data (Sparrow, 
1991; Krebs, 2002; Bright, Hughes, & Chalmers, 2012), especially data that clearly show relationships 
between members of the network, is more challenging with covert networks. Estimates of the size of these 
networks or the amount of data they produce do not exist (Roberts, 2011). These networks face constant 
attempts by governments, the intelligence community, and military groups to disrupt their activities 
(Milward & Raab, 2006), so their members naturally try to evade detection and intervention (McBride & 
Hewitt, 2013), sometimes with deceptive or misleading data (Roberts, 2011). The criminal (covert) nature 
of the organizations behind the networks necessitates quick, nearly immediate real-time analysis and 
reaction for authorities to successfully counter their activities (Everton, 2012a; Dudas, 2013). Covert 
networks can be resilient (Milward & Raab, 2006; Everton, 2012b; Senekal, 2014), often overlap with 
other covert networks (Senekal 2014), and act more like traditional organizations (Raab & Milward, 2003) 
in their attempts to organize and exhibit structure to their activities. 
These difficulties and challenges have not stopped researchers and analysts from analyzing covert 
networks (Roberts & Everton, 2011; Everton, 2012b). Indeed, the practice dates back to countries’ 
analyzing their enemies’ communication patterns in WWII (van Meter, 2001). To overcome the lack of 
complete data, researchers have applied probabilistic modeling (Miffen, Boner, Godfrey, & Skokan 2004) 
and Markov processes (Kaplan, 2010), used overlapping network assumptions (Atkinson & Wein, 2010), 
and approached the problem from a network topology perspective (Xu & Chen, 2008) to model terrorist 
networks. They have successfully applied social network analysis (SNA) to covert networks such as 
corporate price fixing, organized crime, drug trafficking, and terrorist groups (e.g., Krebs, 2002; Sageman, 
2004; Xu, Marshall, Kaza, & Chen, 2004; Rodriguez, 2005; Keefe, 2006; Natarajan, 2006; Reid, Chen, & 
Xu, 2007; Bright et al., 2012; Senekal, 2014). Critical to this success has been the more recent use of 
social media networks and the analysis of these networks and data using existing social network analysis 
techniques (Everton, 2012a; Schroeder, Everton, & Shepherd, 2012; Freeman & Schroeder, 2014) and 
new techniques such as real-time Twitter data analysis and visualization (Cheong & Lee, 2011; Dudas, 
2013). 
3 Social Media Analysis 
Social media content ranges from simple text (a tweet on Twitter or a short post on Facebook) to 
multimedia maps, videos, and pictures. Determining patterns, trends, and connections between and 
among the content is difficult given the sheer quantity of data. Some social media sites provide built-in, yet 
somewhat basic, tools so users can better understand how the community is using the platform. Twitter 
temporally tracks phrases, words, and hashtags in its tweets and then uses these data to provide a list of 
trending topics. Much of the content of trending topics on Twitter is news related (over 85%), and over half 
of the re-tweeted content is news related (Kwak, Lee, Park, & Moon, 2010).  Twitter content also contains 
personal biases and perspectives, especially as the content is re-tweeted and filtered via audience 
gatekeeping (Kwon, Oh, Agrawal, & Rao, 2012). One can combine such content with traditional media to 
better understand the news, its impact, and the immediate grassroots opinions of those involved (Meraz & 
Papacharissi, 2013). This type of analysis and research has become common with the aftermaths of both 
man-made (Lee, Agrawal, & Rao, 2015) and natural (Sutton et al., 2015) disasters and other major 
political or socio-political events (Starbird, Muzny, & Palen, 2012; Starbird & Palen, 2012). These studies 
differ from the current study, however, in that they focus on the public reaction and dissemination of news 
and opinions via social media following a particular event. In contrast, we focus on a particular group’s use 
of social media that does not necessarily relate to a particular event. 
One can use data from social media to research a variety of questions and situations. With the vast 
amount of social media data, researchers and analysts need an organized approach. The process begins 
with a research question. Second, one needs to collect and organize data. Finally, one can analyze the 
data. 
Figure 1 presents the social media analysis framework that Freeman and Schroeder (2014) outline. The 
framework begins on the left with a research question. In order to answer this research question, the 
researcher cycles through the baseline, data-fusion, and data-discovery phases. These data-collection 
phases often loop back on each other and lead the researcher through the analyses. 
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Figure 1. Social Media Analysis Framework
3.1 The Research Question 
The research question drives the data collection and data analysis. One must consider the demographics 
of social media users when developing a research question to ensure social media analysis is an 
appropriate methodology. One should create research questions with an eye towards the intended level of 
analysis regarding location, geographic area, user groupings, or quantity of data (Yurdusev, 1993) 
because the intended level of analysis will influence and drive the collected data. Freeman and Schroeder 
(2014) provide the following examples: 
 What topics are trending in a geographical area? 
 Which user accounts potentially have the most influence? 
 What content are targeted user accounts posting? 
 Where are targeted user accounts posting from for pattern of analysis? 
3.2 Data Collection 
With a research question in mind, one collects data in three phases: baseline, fusion, and discovery. One 
needs to structure all data during data collection in a similar way in order to aggregate, filter, and organize 
the data; researchers often do so using software packages and analytical tools. This point is especially 
critical when one analyzes large quantities of social media data instead of individual pieces of social 
media content. 
The first phase of data collection involves conducting baseline research, which provides a contextual 
understanding of the research question. One needs to perform this step because it is unlikely that social 
media will provide all the information needed to conduct a proper analysis. Instead, the researcher needs 
information to help guide a structured collection of social media data. For example, reports might provide 
names of insurgent organizations of interest, which allows the researcher to search for that name when 
discovering new data via social media. These data often come from unstructured reports; for example, 
news articles or other textual documents (Freeman & Schroeder, 2014). Additionally, baseline data may 
provide information that does not exist on social media. For example, while two people might have a 
relationship by being coworkers, they may not communicate via social media. Having baseline data that 
are structured and can be merged with social media data can fill in gaps from data gained through social 
media collection. 
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After obtaining baseline data, one should fuse or merge these data with other existing datasets. Merging 
the baseline data with additional datasets provides structure to the baseline data, potential structure to the 
yet-to-be-collected data from social media, or data that one can use to fill in existing data gaps. For 
example, providing a basemap where one can plot both baseline data and newly discovered data helps 
one to fuse the data together geospatially. 
Once the baseline phase provides context to the research question and the fusion phase provides 
structure, the analyst can gather additional data via social media platforms. Information gathered from 
baseline research will help provide relevant search criteria. The researcher collects data from the social 
media platforms by creating search parameters to limit the amount of data collected, creating a method to 
retrieve and store the data, setting a schedule for how to collect the data or information, and constructing 
a plan for how to fuse newly discovered data with already collected data. 
3.3 Data Analysis 
The research question will determine which level of analysis to focus on. Social media analysis can take 
place on a micro-level (individuals), macro-level (society or groups of individuals), or anywhere in 
between.  
Micro-level analysis focuses on specific users, events, organizations, links, or other entities. One typically 
knows these entities through prior research and breaking events. Macro-level analysis focuses on large-
scale data collection typically analyzed for trending content, hotspot analysis, and overall network 
structure. This requires data from a large number of user accounts and is similar to listening to the wisdom 
of crowds (Surowiecki, 2005) as opposed to individual opinions. 
One can use different levels of analysis to inform additional discovery. An example of macro-level analysis 
is searching for trending topics related to the Charlie Hebdo attack by querying social media topics such 
as “Charlie Hebdo”, “Paris terrorism”, and “Islam”. Examples of micro-level analysis related to the Charlie 
Hebdo example include analyzing the messages and relations between the users in order to identify key 
or potentially influential user accounts. Additionally, when analyzing a small number of users, one may 
discover a particular hashtag, topic, or link that can lead to a larger-scale search. 
Social media analysis, when guided by a research question, can provide useful information to many 
different problems. The research question, the availability of existing data, and the social media platforms 
under analysis will help determine the appropriate methodology. 
3.3.1 Geospatial Analysis 
Geospatial analysis refers to techniques that one can apply to spatially driven research questions by 
applying location-based (i.e., mapable) tags to the data. The locations can be as specific as a single point 
on a map (latitude and longitude) or as broad as an entire country or continent (de Smith, Goodchild, & 
Longley, 2007). One can reference these locations by coordinates or by name (Goodchild, 2007). Any 
data that can be mapped can be incorporated into geospatial analysis. 
There are three types of location data in social media data: activity locations (based on the actual GPS 
signal), profile locations (based on user-generated information in users’ account profile), and mentioned 
locations (based on locations mentioned in posts). Using geospatial data from the content allows social 
media to be useful in monitoring real-time events. During the Egyptian Revolution in 2011, the term 
“#Tahrirsquare”—a specific location in Cairo and the center of activity during the protests—spiked in 
activity (Stefanidis, Crooks, & Radzikowski, 2013). This mentioned location approach can be prone to 
inflation, however. For example, Katy Perry, the American singer, was one of the most heavily retweeted 
user accounts that commented on the Egyptian Revolution even though she was not there (Schroeder, 
Everton, & Shepherd, 2014). 
3.3.2 Relational Analysis 
Relational analysis refers to techniques that one can apply to relationship-driven research questions by 
assessing how users interact with each other. Relational data are the foundation of most social media 
platforms. When looking at a user’s social media account, social media sites typically present basic 
information on the user account’s relations. Examples of this information include friends, followers, family, 
likes, retweets, and comments. 
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Link analysis and social network analysis are the most common relational analysis techniques for 
visualizing networks. Researchers often use these techniques to determine the popularity of user 
accounts, the centrality of user accounts, and the roles user accounts play in spreading information across 
the social media platform (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Link analysis focuses on the connections between 
social media entities—user accounts, hashtags, links, or shared posts—using software such as Analyst 
Notebook, Palantir, or Semantica to visualize the collected data. One can form these connections in many 
ways, such as: (Freeman & Schroeder, 2014): 
 Between user accounts based on following or being friends 
 Between user accounts and posts by creating, liking, retweeting, or commenting on a post 
 Between users and hashtags by using a hashtag in a post, and 
 Between hashtag and hashtag by appearing in the same post. 
Even with less popular entities and a smaller dataset, the number of entities and the connections between 
and among them on a link analysis visualization of social media data can be vast. Social network analysis 
(SNA), another relational analysis technique, allows researchers to apply metrics to the data to help them 
make sense of visually complicated networks. They can examine the network’s topology, identify central 
nodes or entities, detect subgroups, and locate the roles that individual nodes may play as brokers or 
bridges in the network (Bright et al., 2012; Everton, 2012b). Hansen, Shneiderman, and Smith (2010), 
Shneiderman, Preece, and Pirolli (2011), and Everton (2012b) provide additional details of social network 
analysis with social media. 
3.3.3 Temporal Analysis 
Temporal analysis refers to techniques that one can apply to time-driven research questions by assessing 
temporal tags on the social media data. Most content from social media includes a temporal tag that 
describes when the content was uploaded. In fact, many social media sites have built-in temporal analysis 
tools: trending posts on Twitter, most recent posts on Facebook, and views over time on LinkedIn. 
Three common techniques for temporal analysis include the panel technique, event-count technique, and 
event-history technique (Finkel, 1995; Hannan & Tuma, 1979; Long, 1997). With the panel technique, one 
collects variables over time and then compares them with each other to answer the research question. 
The event-count technique measures (counts) the number of times an event (the variable of interest) 
occurs in a period of time and then compares these counts with other variables. The event-history 
technique measures the time that elapses between two occurrences of an event. One can also combine 
these three techniques in various ways to analyze data in additional ways. 
A common application of temporal analysis techniques involves comparing social media temporal analysis 
with real-world (on-the-ground) temporal analysis. Using the event-count technique, researchers could 
compare counts of the hashtag #Homs, a Syrian city, over time to counts of violence in the same location 
over the same period of time to see if the two have a relationship. From an event-history perspective, a 
researcher could compare the time difference between posts by an insurgent group and events carried out 
by the same group to measure whether there is a relationship between their posting about and carrying 
out these events and what that relationship may be (Freeman & Schroeder, 2014). 
3.3.4 Sentiment Analysis 
Sentiment analysis refers to techniques that extract feelings and opinions from textual content (Shellman, 
Covington, & Zangrilli, 2014). One can generally categorize textual information as either objective 
statements of fact or subjective statements of opinion (Liu, 2010). One can classify most opinions as 
positive or negative (some can be neutral); they can also “be an emotion, a behavioral disposition, or a 
rational judgment” (Shellman, Covington, & Zangrilli, 2014). One assesses each piece of content based 
on a rubric (positive/negative or emotion), and one can analyze an entire conversation or communication 
stream. 
4 Syrian Conflict/ISIS Case Study 
Given the previously identified exploitation of social media by covert networks, the intelligence community 
can use various social media analysis techniques to identify and track the primary social media accounts 
in these covert networks. Once analysts know who to track, they can follow these accounts and perform 
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additional analyses to uncover additional intelligence. Combined, all of the intelligence and analyses 
provide the necessary data needed to fight back against the covert networks whether via social media or 
in the real world. The following case study of the Syrian conflict with particular emphasis on ISIS provides 
real-world examples of how a particular covert network uses (exploits) social media, how one can track 
and analyze this use, how one can mitigate their exploitation of social media, and the limitations that 
remain (meaning the threat remains).  
The growth of social media provided the organizations and individuals involved in the Syrian conflict with 
new modes of communication. This case study illustrates the exploitation of social media by providing a 
description of how the opposition groups in Syria (in particular, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)), 
have used social media. The analysis techniques used provide a means of mitigating this threat (namely, 
the influence and spread of such extremist groups and covert networks). 
4.1 Initial Research Questions 
The following research questions guided the initial work in 2012 (Freeman & Schroeder, 2014): 
 Who were the main political and military opposition groups of the Syrian conflict? 
 Who were the military leaders of the political and military opposition groups of the Syrian 
conflict? 
 If the Assad regime crossed the “red line” per President Obama’s August 2012 speech, which 
groups should U.S. Special Operations Forces partner with to secure chemical, biological, and 
nuclear sites? 
 Are these military opposition groups aligned with violent extremist organizations? 
 Are they successful on the field? 
 Where are their areas of operations? 
 How many fighters do these groups have? 
4.2 Baseline Data and Data Fusion 
From the beginning, the Syrian conflict was one of the most well-documented conflicts on social media 
due to Syria’s literacy rate, broadband and cellular access, and smartphone penetration (Lynch, Freelon, 
& Aday 2014). Individuals used social media to communicate, update, motivate, recruit, and fundraise for 
various opposition groups (Topol, 2012). However, the Syrian conflict intensified and garnered greater 
international attention when President Obama’s “red line” regarding the use of chemical weapons was 
allegedly crossed (Gordon, 2013). The Free Syria Army (FSA) fractionalized (Mahamood & Black, 2013) 
into multiple, militarized opposition forces. ISIS emerged as a legitimate and successful opposition party 
(Reynolds & Caris, 2014). With all of these and the loss of control of large territories in the north and east, 
the Assad regime maintained power (Hwaida & Cowell, 2014). 
The combination of these events and changes in the conflict’s landscape has led to greater regional 
instability and increased violence. Of particular interest for the intelligence community is the emergence 
and rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), a violent extremist organization that operates in both 
Syria and Iraq that claims to be a successor to al-Qaeda (Freeman & Schroeder, 2014). ISIS continues to 
actively use social media to publish information even after accounts are shut down, which can provide 
critical information and intelligence to support counter-operations both in social media and on the ground. 
The Syrian Revolution Martyr Database (2011), a data aggregator of validated and organized 
crowdsourced information, has provided the names, gender, military/civilian status, age, location 
(latitude/longitude), and date/time of conflict-related deaths in Syria since 2011. The resulting geospatial 
analysis in Figure 2 of over 90,000 records shows the intensity of the conflict around Homs, Syria, based 
on the analysis. The bottom of the screenshot shows a temporal histogram and a time wheel. 
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Figure 2. Palantir Screenshot of Shuhada Martyr Data that Visualizes the Intensity of the Syrian Conflict Both 
Geospatially and Temporally (Freeman & Schroeder, 2014) 
The sociogram (a graphical representation of social links and connections in a group via relational 
analysis) in Figure 3 aided in our effectively analyzing the major opposition group in the early part of the 
Syrian conflict, the Free Syria Army (FSA). We derived the data for this sociogram from social media 
sources, the Institute for the Study of War (Holliday, 2011, 2012a, 2012b; O’Bagy 2012a, 2012b, 2012c), 
and the Syrian National Council (2012) in an attempt to capture the density and centralization of the 
nodes. The resulting network graph displays the connections between individuals, political organizations, 
and military units involved with the resistance and opposition to the Assad regime. The hashed oval in the 
center shows the densest connections between individuals, military opposition groups, and political 
opposition groups. The solid oval in the upper right indicates a subgroup of the opposition without strong 
ties to the core of the FSA. This subgroup would eventually split from the FSA to form the National Islamic 
Front with additional elements breaking away to join ISIS. 
 
Figure 3. Sociogram of Political and Military Opposition Groups and Affiliated Individuals from Initial 
Research (Freeman & Schroeder, 2014) 
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4.3 Data Discovery and Analysis: Development of ISIS and its Use of Social Media 
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) originated primarily in Iraq, but it has a strong presence in Syria. 
It has undergone several name and leadership changes, and there is every reason to believe that this will 
continue in the future. In addition to the insurgency operations between ISIS, the Assad Government, and 
the Iraqi Government, ISIS also conducts operations against other insurgent groups in the region 
(Freeman & Schroeder, 2014). 
ISIS has used social media to frame (contextualize) their arguments and position in the context of the 
Syrian Conflict and the larger region (Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986). Framing seeks to 
accomplish three core tasks: 1) identify the problem and its causes (“diagnostic” framing), 2) identify what 
should be done (“prognostic” framing), and 3) encourage members and potential members to act 
(“motivational” framing) (Benford & Snow, 2000). Specifically, ISIS has used social media in all three 
ways. ISIS has blamed the Assad Government, the Free Syrian Army, and many other individuals and 
groups for the current problems in Syria (diagnostic framing). It has explained what needs to be done and 
has called for action (prognostic framing). Finally, it has used religious messages and propaganda to 
encourage such action (motivational framing). Figure 4 presents an example that portrays ISIS in a 
positive light. It was part of a series of images from Iraq that showed ISIS performing the equivalent of 
Civil Affairs by providing entertainment for the children followed by candy and a movie night that espoused 
ISIS propaganda. ISIS propagandist accounts shared the image via Twitter and the website 
www.justpaste.it. 
Figure 4. Image Shared on Twitter and Justpaste.it2
ISIS has used textual posts to frame its position and draw attention to its cause. It has incorporated 
derogatory terms for its opposition that contextualize the conflict into a larger, historical conflict in the 
entire region. It has conducted this framing to convince others to choose sides—ideally, ISIS’s side. ISIS 
has also often framed its position with images. It has displayed pictures of what happens to its enemies or 
those who oppose it, of their own forces’ providing food and aid, and of their victories in battle.  
4.3.1 Geospatial Analysis 
ISIS has framed the conflict in Iraq and Syria by calling many of the airstrikes carried out against ISIS, 
whether carried out by the United States and its coalition partners or by Syria, as attacks by the “Crusader 
Alliance”. Using Sprinklr, a commercial tool for analyzing social media, we collected any tweets from 
                                                     
2 http://justpaste.it/alkher16a 
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Twitter that mentioned “Crusader Alliance” in Arabic from outside the United States during 3 to 30 August, 
2015. We found 23,924 relevant tweets during this time period. 
The first analysis looked at from where the tweets originated. For the 1,843 tweets that contained 
geospatial information (a majority of the tweets did not contain geospatial information), most originated 
from the Middle East with Saudi Arabia at the top of the list. Figure 5 provides a map of tweets with 
geospatial information; darker colors indicate more tweets came from that country (countries in grey had 
no tweets from that location). 
Figure 5. Map of Tweets by Profile Location
While the country information provides some information about where the tweets originated, it is hardly 
complete. Of the 23,924 tweets, only 230 originated from Saudi Arabia. Another method for conducting 
geospatial analysis is to analyze the content of the tweets via analyzing the hashtags and the locations 
that users mention. Table 1 provides a list of the top ten location hashtags. 
Table 1. Counts of Location Hashtags
Hashtag Translation Mentions 
ير ة الخ  Wilayat alKhair 2078 والي
ب ة حل  Wilayat Aleppo 1779 والي
ق ة دمش  Wilayat Damascus 1335 والي
ة ة الرق  Wilayat Ar-Raqqa 872 والي
ار ة األنب  Wilayat Anbar 752 والي
ب  Aleppo 643 حل
ة ة الفلوج  Wilayat Fallujah 626 والي
ة زيرة والي  Wilayat Jazira 562 الج
ة ة دجل  Wilayat Tigris 455 والي
وريا  Syria 437 س
These hashtags had much higher counts than submitted geospatial information, but, instead of explaining 
where the user accounts tweet from, they explain what they were tweeting. Also, some of these names 
are not names of established locations but instead new names that ISIS has created for locations. For 
example, the most prolific hashtag concerned Wilayat al-Khair or the state of Khair. There is no 
established province of Khair inside Syria, but this is the province that ISIS has created that covers Deir 
Ezzor and other areas. 
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By knowing from where tweets are being posted and/or the locations they mention, analysts can reach a 
better understanding of the insurgents’ locations and the primary focus of their conversations, 
respectively. This information enables a more focused analysis than just looking at the messages 
themselves because it assists analysts in answering the “where” question in real time. Geospatial analysis 
differs from other analysis techniques of covert networks such as ISIS because so much of data is 
location based (either from the location of the post or the location mentioned), and understanding the 
importance of the locations is critical to mitigating the threat of such groups. 
4.3.2 Relational Analysis 
One can apply relational analysis to the communication patterns of user accounts to analyze the 
connections between users based on whether a user account mentioned another user account in one of 
its tweets or replies. The analysis focused only on the largest component of the network, which comprised 
1,507 user accounts and 1,850 connections. By analyzing in-degree centrality (see Figure 6), the user 
accounts that the largest number of other user accounts mentioned the most become evident. The top 
users (based on their profile information) in terms of in-degree centrality comprised several Islam scholars 
(largely from Saudi Arabia) and Middle East reporters. Most of these accounts did not have any out 
degree or messages from them going to other users, which suggests that, while they may have been the 
target of the conversation, they were not taking part in it. 
 
Figure 6. Sociogram Depicting the Largest Component of Conversations about “Crusader Alliance” (Nodes 
Sized by In-degree Centrality) 
One can also use social network analysis to see which accounts might potentially be conduits of 
information. Analyzing the network as a graph can identify how often a node lies on the shortest path 
between other nodes by using betweenness centrality (Freeman, 1977). Figure 7 presents the network 
with nodes sized and colored by betweenness centrality. Many of the nodes that had higher betweenness 
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centrality have had their accounts suspended. Of those that have not had their accounts suspended, 
some have already set up backup accounts in case their accounts become suspended. These accounts 
also had very little profile information, but, based on their tweets, they often engaged in conversations 
using sectarian language. 
 
Figure 7. Sociogram Depicting the Largest Component of Conversations about “Crusader Alliance” (Nodes 
Sized and Colored by Betweenness Centrality) 
More than perhaps any other analysis technique, relational analysis provides analysts with the 
connections between the individuals and the groups of individuals being studied. Analysts can focus on 
the “who” and “how” questions in order to identify leaders, detect subgroups, and uncover the brokers or 
bridges in the networks. Relationships are the foundation of most social media platforms (friends, 
followers, likes, retweets, etc.) and, thereby, provide a vast amount of data for analysis. This analysis 
focuses less on the timing or the location of the messages and more on the connections between users. 
4.3.3 Temporal Analysis 
One can also analyze this data temporally, and Figure 8 shows mentions of the phrase “Crusader 
Alliance” peaked on 11 August, 2015, with 2,381 occurrences. On that day, the most common hashtag 
among these tweets was about Aleppo where the United States reported conducting three airstrikes 
against ISIS. Table 2 summarizes the top ten hashtags from our collection on 11 August, 2015. Other 
prominent hashtags were “Atimah” and “Atimah_massacre” where an airstrike reportedly injured civilians 
inside a refugee camp. This incident prompted many in Turkey to criticize the Turkish Government for 
allowing the United States to use bases in Turkey as part of the campaign against ISIS; they framed the 
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issue as Turkey’s being complicit in a campaign in which those Twitter accounts may not have particularly 
agreed. 
Figure 8. Timeline of Mentions of “Crusader Alliance” in Arabic from Twitter 
 
Table 2. Counts of Hashtags from 11 August, 2015
Hashtag Translation Mentions 
ة# ب_والي  Wilayet_Aleppo 223 حل
ة# ة_دول  State_Caliphate 219 الخالف
 Atimah_massacre 179 أطمة_مجزرة#
 Urgent 169 عاجل#
 Atimah 159 أطمة#
ش# نة_جي  Sunna_Army 156 الس
ب#  Idlib 150 إدل
ش# ح_جي  Army_conquest 117 الفت
ام_أحرار#  Ahrar_alSham 110 الش
ة# رة_جبھ  Alnusra_front 104 النص
Though many tweets might contain a hashtag framing an issue in a particular way, there still might not be 
many user accounts that use that hashtag. Maher and Carter (2014) are among many who have used 
Twitter to track and analyze ISIS-related sentiment and other activity. They found that just fewer than 20 
percent of the tweets for a single hashtag campaign (#AllEyesOnISIS) originated from a small set of 
accounts, a participation asymmetry found elsewhere in political-based activism. 
Temporal analyses allow analysts to focus on the “when” question by looking at a particular point in time 
or a particular period of time. Analysts can hone in on events both in social media and in the real world to 
uncover connections and relationships and, therefore, provide greater insight into the activities on social 
media relative to significant events in the real world. Temporal analysis focuses less on the relationships 
between accounts and more on those between the larger subgroups and groups. 
4.3.4 Sentiment Analysis 
In order to see how prevalent sectarian terms are in an overall conversation, one can use a word cloud to 
display the content of the conversation by counting how often different words appear (a form of sentiment 
analysis). Figure 9 presents a word cloud of the most frequent terms (we translated the original Arabic into 
English using Google Translate). “Crusader” and “Alliance” were the two most prominent terms because 
they were the search criteria. Also, the tweets often mentioned many place names. Of interest is that 
“Safavid” and “Alnasiri” are also common terms: they are some of the loaded sectarian terms that have 
framed the conflict in terms of the Sunni-Shia divide. 
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Figure 9. Word Cloud of the “Crusader Alliance” Conversations 
Sentiment analysis extracts meaning from data by allowing one to view it in new ways. A word cloud is 
one method of viewing the social media data through the implied importance of the terms used in the 
actual posts. This type of analysis does not consider location (geospatial), account connection (relational), 
or timing (temporal) data. Other forms of sentiment analysis that focus on statements of fact versus 
statements of opinion provide analysts with insight into the feelings and the potential framing of the 
propaganda and arguments being made through social media. 
4.3.5 Synthesis 
This analysis looks at historic data, but one could automate and conduct much of it in real time. Dudas 
(2013, p. 631) provides examples of more complex visualization and mapping of tweets and data from 
other online and social media sources from Syria through “dynamic network visualization, a tweet wall 
post, and [a] map with geotagged tweets”. Most importantly, Dudas generated this visualization and 
mapping in real time. Dudas found that external websites drive much of the Twitter activity, which means 
the Twitter activity is not original but rather a way of sharing existing content and information. 
ISIS propaganda accounts often link to other websites that can anonymously host longer postings such as 
www.dump.to, an anonymous posting website similar to pastebin.com and Justpaste.it, a website that 
used to have much more ISIS-related postings until they started being deleted. ISIS also uses websites 
that can host videos as alternatives to YouTube, such as the Internet Archive.  
ISIS has proven to be resilient in their use of social media. Many Twitter accounts have been suspended 
or shut down many times (frequently due to gruesome content). Still, when old accounts are shut down, 
new accounts continue to emerge. Some of these accounts will post information about their backup 
accounts to maintain communication in the event of a shutdown. 
Overall, ISIS has successfully used social media to spread their influence. It has an organized mechanism 
and uses a variety of social media networks. It effectively uses social media to attack other groups and 
individuals, to report its on-ground battles and attacks, to provide evidence of its effective leadership and 
aid to the areas it controls, and to justify its actions. It does all of these things, of course, with the larger 
goal of gaining ideological and financial support from members and non-members. 
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4.4 Adaptation of ISIS and its Use of Social Media 
The social media activities of the insurgency have changed and adapted over the course of the Syrian 
conflict. Early in the conflict, new members of the insurgency would typically post YouTube videos in 
which they announced their defection from the Syrian military or government and often showed their 
government identification as further insult. While these groups did not necessarily join ISIS, they did 
create their own covert network in Syria. Lately, video postings show group events such as attacks, 
humanitarian efforts, and ideological speeches. 
Additionally, over time, ISIS has used Twitter and Facebook less, but daily tweets about ISIS still number 
around 90,000 (Sanchez, 2015). The number has likely decreased due to the Assad Government’s 
increased listening efforts on these public networks (Freeman & Schroeder, 2014). ISIS has turned to 
products such as Skype for video sharing and communication. No longer public, these messages are 
much harder to track and analyze, but not impossible (Faris, 2012). 
As social media sites suspend ISIS and affiliated accounts, the effect is only temporary. New accounts are 
created, and they quickly regain their followers. The use of dump.to, as we describe above, allows 
individuals to anonymously post and disseminate content. Users post pictures of textual content, rather 
than the actual text, to avoid automated social media content analysis, translation, and queries. Still, this 
case study demonstrates some of the intelligence-gathering techniques in use that take advantage of the 
wealth of data available on social media. New analysis techniques will only improve the accuracy and 
effectiveness of the analysis going forward. 
5 Discussion 
Keeping track of social media accounts, especially new accounts, that are affiliated with a covert network 
is a difficult task; however, the network’s interactions with other users may provide the ability to quickly 
identify these new accounts. As user accounts affiliated with a covert network are repeatedly shut down, 
the covert network needs a way to communicate to their members which accounts are the new accounts. 
One way in which these new accounts attract their audience is for affiliated accounts that have not been 
shut down to mention, or link to, the new account, which lets their followers know that the newly 
mentioned account is one that they should follow. This method makes it harder for researchers or analysts 
who simply read the tweets of popular accounts to quickly find out what account they should watch. 
However, a social network analysis of the mentioning of the new account creates a unique and very 
distinguishable pattern. In particular, it creates an area with a very high density of mentions when looking 
at a sociogram of the conversation (see Figure 10), which may make it easier for researchers or analysts 
to identify the new accounts. Nodes are user accounts, and the sociogram connects accounts if they send 
a message or re-post a message to another user account. Nodes are colored by a subgroup-detection 
algorithm. The green subgroup (in the center) largely includes ISIS-affiliated propaganda accounts. 
 
Figure 10. Sociogram of Twitter Conversation about ISIS
Communications of the Association for Information Systems 113
 
Volume 41   Paper 05  
 
While social media analysis provides an additional means of information gathering about covert networks, 
it only does so because those covert networks choose to post that information in a public setting. 
Additionally, depending on the country of interest, different social media platforms may contain more or 
less information. For example, to analyze actions carried out by the insurgency in Ukraine, more relevant 
information may be found on VK, a Russian social media platform, than other social media platforms. In 
order to conduct effective analysis using social media, one needs to understand whether the covert 
network uses social media platforms and, if so which ones. 
The Syrian conflict and ISIS case study demonstrates covert networks’ exploiting social media. 
Unfortunately, the nature of social media and the nature of covert networks’ use of social media make this 
threat difficult to mitigate. In addition, social network analysis researchers often have limited control over 
their access to data sources and the quality of these data sources. Bright et al. (2012) argue that this 
inherent challenge, especially regarding research into covert networks, has a tendency to “foster 
opportunistic rather than theory driven research” (p. 153), a sentiment that Morselli (2009) also 
acknowledges. Theory does exist regarding the disruption of covert networks (McBride & Hewitt, 2013; 
Everton, 2012b; Roberts & Everton, 2011, 2016), but this case study concerns how covert networks (ISIS 
in particular) use social media and how one can use social media analyses to track and learn about them. 
The case study stops short of the strategies and tactics used to disrupt ISIS. Therefore, this descriptive 
case study (Yin, 1984) follows an opportunistic approach that would hopefully lead to better strategies and 
tactics for disruption based on identifying the network, its participants, and their connections. This 
research also has the potential to provide a more robust understanding about how covert networks frame 
their arguments and position as Snow et al. (1986) and Benford and Snow (2000) describe. 
The social media analysis techniques we use here all have characteristics that limit their effectiveness. Of 
all the different methodologies that one can apply to social media data, geospatial analysis is currently the 
most limited. Activity location data are rarely available because most users do not enable the GPS feature 
on their mobile devices (Backstrom, Sun, & Marlow, 2010), and social media platforms would not collect 
these data from content created on devices without this feature. Because users can easily falsify profile 
information and have out-of-date profile information, profile locations are often inaccurate. However, a 
user can mention any location without actually being in that location at the time. Considering that most of 
the social media data are either missing geospatial information or may have inaccurate geospatial 
information, researchers must be skeptical about the data’s validity. 
Social media sites are built on the basis that interaction takes place, and social network analysis is an 
effective way to analyze interactions between entities (Freeman, 2004). However, one needs to 
understand the differences that exist between how people interact in the real world and how user 
accounts interact via social media (Kane, Alavi, Labianca, & Borgatti 2014). First, social media networks, 
due to the way in which they create nodes and connections, do not necessarily share the same 
characteristics of social networks found in society. Second, not all user accounts are individuals. Third, not 
everyone who follows an account actually knows the account holder. Still, relational analysis is a common 
methodology for analyzing social media data. In addition, social media users can intentionally create noise 
and false connections by interacting with random, unconnected accounts, and they can create false and 
misleading posts to thwart effective observation. 
There are serious limitations to effective sentiment analysis as a result of idioms, sarcasm, double 
negatives, innuendos, foreign words/phrases, cultural references/idiosyncrasies, and 
homonyms/homographs. As a result, researchers have begun using machine learning and powerful 
language parsing tools to increase the efficacy of sentiment analysis techniques (Paltaglou, 2014).  
Additionally, individuals often use social media for real-time communication, planning, and coordination. If 
the analysis is not available in real time, appropriate and effective countermeasures and reactions are not 
possible (Everton, 2012a). Covert networks and their supporters and followers will attempt to fool the 
intelligence community and evade detection by using multiple social media accounts, fake accounts, and 
misleading information (Roberts, 2011; McBride & Hewitt, 2013). New analysis techniques will only 
improve the accuracy and effectiveness of the analysis going forward. 
Based on recent history, we can reasonably assume that social media platforms and functionality will 
continue to evolve. They will become faster and easier to use and provide new functionality, which will 
them more attractive to these covert networks (Everton 2012a). So long as the leadership and members 
of these covert networks perceive that their posts are not being analyzed, they will have no reason to 
change their operations. However, once they feel threatened, the covert networks will move on to other 
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social media networks and, thus, stay one step ahead of those who attempt to track them. As such, to 
mitigate this threat, the intelligence community needs to continue to stay abreast of the technological 
revolution that is social media (Freeman & Schroeder, 2014). 
Dudas (2013) addresses three areas for future research. The first uses a sentiment lexicon to rate 
keywords on a positive/negative scale and then maps these keywords against the target keyword over 
time. Figure 11 provides an example of this sentiment analysis. 
 
Figure 11. A Markup of the Sentiment Visualization (Dudas, 2013) 
Another area attempts to extend the analysis of social networks beyond username  username 
connections. Using username  hashtag and hashtag  hashtag connections will hopefully lead to new 
insights into the structure of covert networks. A third area looks to further enhance existing temporal data 
visualization functionality to allow for prediction and forecasting through machine learning. It is not 
sufficient to only look at historical or even real-time data; staying ahead of the covert networks and their 
potential activity is critical to successful counter-efforts. 
In addition to developing new social media analysis techniques or attempting to guess where covert 
networks will turn to next in terms of their social media usage, some in the intelligence community believe 
that one can use social media itself to counter and alienate the covert networks by reframing the covert 
networks’ messages and turning public opinion against them (Kilcullen, 2010; Everton, 2012a). Those 
outside of the intelligence community have also entered this fight by attempting to disrupt or shut down 
known ISIS accounts and followers—a form of justified hacking (Freeman & Peace, 2005)—as the recent 
success of the hacking group Anonymous evidences (Petroff, 2015). 
6 Conclusion 
Covert networks can exploit social media—especially due to its being available to nearly anyone with 
Internet access—to foster membership, communicate among followers and non-followers, and obtain 
ideological and financial support. The intelligence community can track and analyze these covert 
networks’ use of social media via a variety of tools and techniques, but the analysis is imperfect and 
incomplete. Our case study of the Syrian conflict, the emergence of ISIS, and ISIS’s use of social media 
provide examples of the current state of affairs regarding the use of social media by this particular covert 
network. 
In our analysis, we provide maps of the groups’ communication patterns and identify potentially influential 
user accounts. This new intelligence will hopefully lead to informed operational decisions and greater 
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success in combatting these covert networks. However, these covert networks also continue to adapt and 
remain difficult to track. New user accounts are quickly created when existing accounts are shut down, 
and these new accounts regain the followers of the former accounts. While one can mitigate the threat, 
one cannot eliminate it. 
As long as the leaders and members of covert networks believe the benefits of using social media 
outweigh the negatives, these opposition groups will continue to use social media to frame their messages 
and communicate with their followers. These groups will continue to adapt and improve how they use 
social media in an attempt to remain hidden from governments, the intelligence community, and law 
enforcement. As such, we need additional advances in social media analysis to continue this ongoing 
battle. 
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